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INTRODUCTION
The maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio (an action does not arise from a base cause) 
is premised on the notion that the courts will not assist a claimant who founds his claim 
on an immoral or illegal act. The principle, however, which seeks to discourage fraud, 
has had a notable exception when the claimant voluntarily withdraws from an illegal 
transaction before the illegal purpose has been wholly or partly carried into effect. 
In Patel v Mirza,1 the Court of Appeal held that the exception could apply equally to 
cases where the withdrawal takes place because the illegal agreement can no longer be 
performed because of events outside the control of the parties. 
The illegality doctrine has, however, since been more fully explored by the Supreme 
Court in Mirza v Patel  2 (on appeal from the Court of Appeal) who has effectively 
abandoned the so- called “reliance test” adopted by the House of Lords in Tinsley v 
Milligan3 in favour of a policy- driven approach requiring the court to consider a range 
of relevant factors in deciding whether the claimant should be allowed to recover his 
money despite the illegal transaction.
FACTS
The defendant, Salman Mirza, was a foreign exchange broker who had offered the claim-
ant, Chandrakant Patel, and their mutual friend, George Georgiou, the opportunity to 
use his spread- betting account to bet on the movement of Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) 
shares. The claimant had paid the defendant £620,000 on hearing that the defendant 
had contacts with the bank who could supply advance information about a statement 
anticipated to be made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer about the Government’s 
investment in the bank which would affect the bank’s share prices.
The plan was that the defendant would use the money, along with his own, to bet 
on the Investor’s Gold Index on movements in the quoted share price over a specified 
period using insider information. As it turned out, the defendant did not place any bets 
because the Government statement never materialised. The money was later mistakenly 
paid to Mr Georgiou. Unable, however, to recover from Mr Georgiou, the claimant 
sought to recover the money from the defendant as money paid for a consideration which 
had wholly failed and/or that it was held by the defendant on a resulting trust for him. 
At first instance,4 Mr Donaldson QC (sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court) 
held that the claim was barred by illegality because it was founded on an illegal agree-
ment which sought to take advantage of insider information. Moreover, the relief could 
not be granted as the claimant had not withdrawn from the agreement voluntarily before 
its implementation became frustrated. In his view, the rationale for the defence of locus 
1 [2014] EWCA Civ 1047.
2 [2016] UKSC 42.
3 [1994] 1 AC 340.
4 [2013] EWHC 1892 (Ch).
poenitentiae was missing where the illegal purpose is not achieved because it is frustrated 
other than by the action of the claimant.
COURT OF APPEAL DECISION
On appeal,5 the majority (Rimer and Vos LJJ) concluded that the deputy judge had been 
correct to find that the claimant needed to rely on the illegal arrangement, aimed at 
achieving a profit from the movement of the RBS shares by using insider information,6 
in order to make out his claim. According to Rimer LJ, it was apparent that the claimant 
was positively relying on the illegal agreement in order to support his claim for the 
return of the money. Vos LJ, agreeing, added that the claimant had pleaded, relied upon 
and succeeded (in the deputy judge’s judgment) in establishing the illegal agreement and 
could not now be heard to say that he could have succeeded as well had he not done so.7 
Gloster LJ, however, felt unable to agree with the majority on the primary issue of 
whether the claimant had to rely on the illegality in order to found his claim for recovery 
of the money. In her Ladyship’s view, the correct approach was to consider the ex turpi 
causa rule by reference to a number of policy considerations underlying the rule. So 
far as the present case was concerned, no insider information was ever received or 
used and no insider dealing ever took place. More importantly, the claimant was not 
seeking to enforce the criminal conspiracy entered into between the parties – on the 
contrary, his claim was to recover the money which he originally deposited with the 
defendant in circumstances where no bets were placed and the consideration under 
the contract had wholly failed. Significantly, he was not seeking to recover any benefit 
from his own wrongdoing. Moreover, the obvious consequence of denying recovery to 
the claimant would be to allow the defendant (as the more blameworthy agent) to profit 
disproportionately from the illegal agreement.
The Court of Appeal, however, was unanimous in reversing the deputy judge’s deci-
sion on the application of the locus poenitentiae defence. According to Rimer LJ, the 
decision in Bigos v Bousted,8 relied on heavily by the deputy judge, was distinguishable 
in so far as it was concerned with the frustration of the illegal agreement because of the 
other party’s refusal to perform it. It did not assist in resolving the issue where the illegal 
purpose had become impossible of performance by reason of a change of circumstances 
beyond the control of either of the parties to the illegal contract. On this point, it was 
open to the claimant to rely on the wholly unperformed illegal agreement because no 
distinction was to be made between “(a) cases where the withdrawal is from an illegal 
agreement which is no longer needed for the purpose for which it was designed, and (b) 
where the withdrawal is from an illegal agreement that cannot be or is anyway not going 
to be performed.”9 In his Lordship’s view, to recognise such a distinction would require 
proof of “genuine repentance” on the part of the withdrawer – something which was 
emphatically rejected by Millett LJ in the earlier case of Tribe v Tribe,10 who confined 
the defence to cases where the claimant “has withdrawn from the transaction before the 
illegal purpose has been wholly or partly carried into effect.”11 
5 [2014] EWCA Civ 1047.
6 Insider dealing is an offence under s.52 of Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993. It may also amount to a conspiracy 
contrary to s.1 of the Criminal Law Act 1977.
7 [2014] EWCA Civ 1047, at [102].
8 [1951] 1 All ER 92.
9 [2014] EWCA Civ 1047, at [45].
10 [1996] Ch 107.
11 Ibid, at [134]–[135].
The other members of the Court took a similar approach. Vos LJ12 concluded that a 
claimant may take advantage of the exception to the illegality principle:
“. . . if he voluntarily withdraws from an illegal transaction under which property has 
been transferred, without the need for genuine repentance, before the fraud or the illegal 
purpose has been wholly or partly carried into effect.”
In the present case, it was apparent that the transfer of money only allowed the defend-
ant “to be ready to undertake”13 the illegal insider dealing. On this analysis, the pay-
ment of the money did not by itself “wholly or partially carry the illegal purpose into 
effect, since it remained open to [the defendant] to withdraw from the transaction and 
to reclaim his funds at any time before the shares were purchased with the benefit 
of insider information.”14 Moreover, since the reason for the withdrawal is irrelevant, 
there was no justification for drawing a distinction between “withdrawal from an illegal 
agreement that is no longer needed . . . and withdrawal because the illegal agreement 
can no longer be performed.”15 
Similarly, according to Gloster LJ, the locus poenitentiae defence did not depend on 
the “vague and subjective concept of genuine ‘repentance’ or ‘withdrawal’ prior 
to the time at which the illegal agreement no longer is, or appears to be, capable of 
performance”.16 The simple fact in the present case was that the illegal purpose had 
not been carried into effect. The bet on the RBS shares was never placed and all that 
happened was that the £620,000 was received by the defendant in his private bank 
account.17
CRITICISM OF THE RELIANCE TEST
The so- called “reliance rule”, stated by the House of Lords in Tinsley, has been the 
subject of much debate. It has been criticised for producing uncertainty as to the exact 
meaning of reliance and for precluding the courts from paying attention to the policies 
underlying the illegality defence. The Law Commission, in its final report, The Illegality 
Defence,18 considered that the rule applied in Tinsley was arbitrary in differentiat-
ing between situations where a presumption of resulting trust and a presumption of 
advancement arose. The rule generated different results which were entirely fortuitous 
depending on the relationship of the parties. In an earlier report, Illegal Transactions: 
The Effect of Illegality on Contracts and Trusts,19the Commission recommended the 
abandonment of the rule altogether in favour of granting the courts a discretion to 
declare a contract or trust illegal or invalid. The Commission also identified a number 
of potentially relevant factors to be applied in determining whether a claim should be 
disallowed by reason of illegality.
As we saw earlier, the deputy judge in Mirza, held that the claimant’s right to recover 
the money paid to the defendant was unenforceable because he had to rely on his own 
illegality to establish it, unless he could have brought himself within the exception of 
12 [2014] EWCA Civ 1047, at [113].
13 Ibid, at [116].
14 Ibid, at [116].
15 Ibid, at [116].
16 Ibid, at [96].
17 Ibid, at [95]. In the words of Gloster LJ: “Other than the illegal agreement itself, nothing illegal actually occurred”.
18 (2010), Law Com. 320.
19 (1999), Law Com. CP, No. 154.
locus poenitentiae. In the Court of Appeal, the majority agreed with the deputy judge 
on the reliance issue, but disagreed with him on the application of the exception. The 
minority view of Gloster LJ, however, was to reject the Tinsley approach and to consider 
instead whether the policy underlying the rule which made the contract illegal would 
be stultified by allowing the claim to succeed. In addressing that issue, her Ladyship 
applied, as we have seen, a number of factors including the degree of connection between 
the wrongful conduct and the claim made and the disproportionality of disallowing the 
claim to the unlawfulness of the conduct. This so- called “range of factors” approach 
has much to recommend it, not least because it permits flexibility and allows the court 
to reach a result having regard to a variety of policy considerations underlying the 
illegality doctrine – it has been adopted in other Commonwealth jurisdictions, notably, 
Australia, Canada and the United States. 
CRITICISM OF THE LOCUS POENITENTIAE DEFENCE
In Tribe v Tribe,20 a father transferred company shares to his son as a means of 
safeguarding them from his landlord who had required substantial repairs to be carried 
out on two properties occupied by the company. In the event, the father was not required 
to carry out the repairs and sought to recover the shares from his son. The father was 
allowed to recover the shares. The Court of Appeal held that, since the illegal purpose 
had never been carried out, the father could adduce evidence of the agreement that the 
son would hold the shares on a bare trust for him pending settlement of the repairs 
claim and thereby rebut the presumption of advancement. Although the transaction 
(i.e., the transfer of shares) had been carried into effect, the purpose had not since the 
landlord had not actually been deceived by the transaction. This was the view taken 
by Nourse L.J. The same conclusion was reached by Millett L.J., although he stated 
the principle in much broader terms – it would be open to the transferor to voluntarily 
withdraw from the transaction before the purpose had been wholly (or partly) per-
formed. Moreover, a voluntary withdrawal did not require genuine repentance. The 
underlying rationale for the locus poenitentiae doctrine was to encourage withdrawal 
from a proposed fraud before it was implemented. This was in itself a desirable end 
just as the converse rule serves justice by discouraging fraud in the first place by refus-
ing to provide assistance to a claimant who seeks to found his action on an illegal 
act.
Despite its apparent merits, the approach taken by Millett L.J. has been the subject of 
criticism, not least because it is unclear at what point the transaction has been carried 
into effect so as to prevent a withdrawal. The notion that a withdrawal can take place 
before the illegal purpose has been only partly carried into effect only adds to this 
uncertainty and confusion. Moreover, the superficiality of seeking to draw a distinction 
between the transaction, on the one hand, and the purpose on the other, inevitably leads 
to fine and artificial distinctions. Surely, in Tribe, the illegal purpose had, in every sense, 
been carried out once the shares had been transferred to the son. After all, this had 
the effect of divesting the father of all interest in the shares. On one view, the illegal 
purpose was to deceive creditors, but an equally plausible interpretation is that the 
father’s purpose was to make it look as if he no longer owned the shares by transferring 
them to his son. Although there was no deception, there can be no denying that the 
father had clearly fulfilled that purpose. 
20 [1996] Ch 107.
Interestingly, the point was addressed briefly in Mirza in the Court of Appeal, where 
Vos LJ21 noted that property could be transferred under an illegal transaction without 
the illegal purpose of the transaction being wholly or partly performed. He said:22
“The transfer of the property may, in some circumstances, be properly regarded as simply 
preparatory and unconnected to the illegal purpose that was ultimately in view.”
Like Tribe, therefore, where the creditors had never been told of the transfer, the transfer 
of money in Mirza merely allowed the defendant the opportunity to further the criminal 
conspiracy without actually (wholly or partly) carrying the illegal purpose into effect. 
As his Lordship observed, “no shares were purchased here, and no information was 
obtained.”23 
SUPREME COURT RULING
The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the defendant’s appeal and allowed the 
claimant to recover the £620,000 which he had paid to the defendant. This was done, 
however, by adopting a public policy analysis similar to that applied by Gloster LJ in the 
Court of Appeal. In so doing, the Supreme Court has overruled the decision in Tinsley.
According to the majority of their Lordships, (Lords Toulson giving the leading 
speech with whom Lady Hale and Lords Kerr, Wilson and Hodge agreed) the essential 
rationale of the illegality doctrine was that it would be contrary to the public interest 
to enforce a claim if to do so would be harmful to the integrity of the legal system. In 
assessing whether the public interest would be harmed in this way, it was necessary 
for a court to consider: (1) the underlying purpose of the prohibition which has been 
transgressed and whether that purpose will be enhanced by denial of the claim; (2) 
any other relevant public policy on which the denial of the claim may have an impact; 
and (3) whether denial of the claim would be a proportionate response to the illegal-
ity. Moreover, within that framework, various factors might be relevant, including the 
seriousness of the conduct, its centrality to the contract, whether it was intentional and 
whether there was marked disparity in the parties’ respective culpability.24
So far as the question of locus poenitentiae was concerned, this was no longer relevant 
because it assumed importance only because of the wrong approach to the issue whether 
the claimant was entitled to the recovery of his money enunciated in Tinsley. In place 
of the reliance rule and the limited exception to it, a person who satisfies the ordinary 
requirements of a claim in unjust enrichment will not now be debarred from recovering 
money paid by reason of the fact that the consideration which has failed was an unlawful 
consideration. So far as the present appeal was concerned, it was apparent that the 
claimant satisfied those requirements. Moreover, he was not be prevented from enforc-
ing his claim simply because the money he sought to recover was paid for an unlawful 
purpose. In particular, there were no circumstances suggesting that enforcement of his 
claim would undermine the integrity of the justice system.25 Accordingly, the claimant 
was entitled to the return of his money.
A dissenting view, however, was expressed by three of the Law Lords who preferred 
to dismiss the appeal on conventional principles. Lord Mance called for “a limited 
21 [2014] EWCA Civ 1047, at [114].
22 Ibid, at [114].
23 Ibid, at [116].
24 [2016] UKSC 42, at [120], per Lord Toulson.
25 Ibid, at [121], per Lord Toulson.
approach to the effect of illegality”26 focusing on the need to avoid inconsistency in 
the law. In his view, replacing the current law with an “open and unsettled range of 
factors”27 would only create more problems for future courts. In his Lordship’s words:28
“What is apparent is this approach would introduce not only a new era but entirely novel 
dimensions into any issue of illegality. Courts would be required to make a value judg-
ment, by reference to a widely spread melange of ingredients, about the overall ‘merits’ 
or strengths, in a highly unspecified non- legal sense, of the respective claims of the public 
interest and of each of the parties.”
Lord Clarke, adopting a similar stance, expressed concern that the court’s power to deny 
recovery on the ground of illegality should be limited to well- defined circumstances. In 
his view, there was no need to replace that approach with an open- ended discretionary 
jurisdiction29 which was “far too vague and potentially far too wide to serve as the 
basis on which a person may be denied his legal rights.”30 The correct approach, in 
his view, was to “address the problem by supplying a framework of principle which 
accommodates legitimate concerns about the present law.”31 Lord Sumption, again in 
similar vein, acknowledged that the reliance test, if devoid of the arbitrary requirements 
associated with the equitable presumptions of resulting trust and advancement, was 
sound in principle. This was because:
“First, it gives effect to the basic principle that a person may not derive a legal right 
from his own illegal act. Second, it establishes a direct causal link between the illegality 
an the claim, distinguishing between those illegal acts which are collateral or matters of 
background only, and those from which the legal right asserted can be said to derive. 
Third, it ensures that the illegality principle applies no more widely than is necessary 
to give effect to its purpose of preventing legal rights from being derived from illegal 
acts.”32
In his Lordship’s view, therefore, justice could still be achieved by the application of the 
Tinsley doctrine without the necessity of revolutionising the law. An entirely discretion-
ary approach, on the other hand, based on a range of evolving factors, converts “legal 
principle into an exercise of judicial discretion, in the process exhibiting all the vices of 
‘complexity, uncertainty, arbitrariness and lack of transparency’ which [the majority of 
the Supreme Court] attributes to the present law.”33
CONCLUSION
The flexible “range of factors” approach taken by the majority34 of the Supreme Court 
opens the way for a structured analysis of the facts in a given case which hopefully 
will promote, rather than detract from, consistency in this area of law. As Lord Kerr 
26 Ibid, at [192].
27 Ibid, at [192].
28 Ibid, at [206].
29 Ibid, at [214].
30 Ibid, at [217].
31 Ibid, at [217].
32 Ibid, at [239].
33 Ibid, at [265].
34 As we have seen, Lords Sumption, Mance and Clarke dissented. In their view, the range of factors approach converted 
the legal principle in Tinsley into an exercise of discretion and required the courts to make value judgments about the 
respective claims of the parties. For that reason, it was unjustified and not necessary to achieve substantial justice in 
most cases.
observed, it also has “the added advantage of avoiding the need to devise piecemeal and 
contrived exceptions to previous formulations of the illegality rule.”35 
What essentially the Supreme Court has done is to replace a rule of principle (enunci-
ated in Tinsley) with an expression of policy. The weighing of rival policy considerations 
is now the proper approach in determining whether a defence of illegality should be 
allowed to succeed. In the words of Lord Neuberger (agreeing in principle with Lord 
Toulson’s analysis):36
“When faced with a claim based on a contract which involves illegal activity (whether or 
not the illegal activity has been wholly, partly or not at all undertaken), the court should, 
when deciding how to take into account the impact of the illegality on the claim, bear in 
mind the need for integrity and consistency in the justice system, and in particular (a) 
the policy behind the illegality, (b) any other public policy issues, and (c) the need for 
proportionality.”
Undoubtedly, this marks a significant change in the law, not least because the policy 
factors identified by the majority of the Supreme Court will now be used to influence 
an essentially new discretionary jurisdiction as to whether a claimant should be entitled 
to the return of his money or property. It remains to be seen, however, whether this 
“revolutionary”37 approach will lead to clarity or serve as a tool for further complexity 
and arbitrariness by simply substituting “a new mess for an old one”.38
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